Using survey data of inflation expectations across a 36 developed and developing countries, this paper examines whether the adoption of inflation targeting has helped to anchor inflation expectations. We examine the response of inflation expectations following a shock to inflation, inflation expectations, and oil prices. For the 13 countries that adopted inflation targeting midway through the time period used in this study, there is a significant difference in the responses between the earlier and the later subperiods. A shock leads to a positive, significant, and persistent increase inflation expectations in the earlier, pre-targeting subperiod, but the same response is much less significant and persistent in the later, posttargeting subperiod. For the control group of 23 countries that did not adopt inflation targeting during this time period, there is no difference between responses in the earlier and the later sub-periods.
Introduction
Milton Friedman said that "In ‡ation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon" (1968) . Friedman was careful to qualify that in ‡ation is a "steady and sustained rise in prices", for while a number of factors can lead to a transitory movement in prices in the short run, only monetary policy can cause a sustained rise in the price level over the medium to long run. Movements in current in ‡ation could be driven by a number of factors unrelated to monetary policy, but the expectation of in ‡ation over the long run should be entirely driven by their perception of monetary policy.
The bene…t of setting a credible in ‡ation target is that it anchors in ‡ation expectations (Bernanke et al., 2001) . If the central bank announces that it will keep in ‡ation at x% over the medium to long run, and agents believe them, then the public's in ‡ation expectations should be x%.
Given the general lack of direct observations of in ‡ation expectations for many countries, most empirical papers that test the e¤ect of in ‡ation targeting measure the e¤ect of targeting on the level and variability of observed in ‡ation. Here the evidence about the e¤ectiveness of in ‡ation targeting is mixed. Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) …nd that the adoption of in ‡ation targeting in developed countries has led to a steeper drop in the level and variability of observed in ‡ation than in similar countries that did not adopt in ‡ation targeting. Gonçalves and Salles (2008) extend this analysis to a group of developing countries and …nd the opposite. They argue that, compared with other developing countries that did not adopt in ‡ation targeting, in ‡ation targeting countries have experienced signi…cantly greater falls in both the level and volatility of in ‡ation. Ball and Sheridan (2005) …nd the same results, but they argue that much of this is simply explained by a reversion to the mean. Brito and Bystedt (2010) argue with a panel data study that these bene…ts of in ‡ation targeting in developing countries wash out when one controls for a common time component. Similarly, Lin and Ye (2007; argue that after accounting for self-selection using propensity score methods, the adoption of in ‡ation targeting has no e¤ect on either the level or volatility or observed in ‡ation in both developed and developing countries. Walsh (2007) and Crowe (2010) argue that the adoption of in ‡ation targeting boosts the transparency of the central bank, and Crowe and Meade (2008) and Dincer and Eichengreen (2007; 2013) …nd empirical evidence that greater central bank transparency reduces both the level and the variability of observed in ‡ation.
Since in ‡ation expectations are incorporated into wage and price setting, which then a¤ect the price level in the future, the unanchoring of in ‡ation expectations is closely related to the persistence of observed in ‡ation. Benati (2008) estimates in ‡ation persistence in many di¤erent countries across many di¤erent monetary regimes. He …nds that in ‡ation persistence was near zero in many of the countries on the gold standard, while he cannot reject the hypothesis that in many developed countries in ‡ation followed a random walk throughout much of the post-World War II period. He …nds that in the post-Volcker United States, in ‡ation does not follow a random walk but the persistence parameter is still positive and signi…cant, while persistence is near zero in many in ‡ation targeting countries.
Using more direct measures of in ‡ation expectations from far forward Treasury yields, Gürkaynak et al. (2005) …nd that in the U.S., long-run in ‡ation expectations respond to macroeconomic news. Long-forward rates, which they argue are mainly composed of in ‡ation expectations, should not respond to macroeconomic news if in ‡ation expectations are truly anchored. Gürkaynak et al. (2006) do a similar exercise but compare the response of farforward rates in the U.S., the UK, and Sweden to macroeconomic news. They …nd that far forward rates respond very little to news in in ‡ation targeting Sweden and respond the most in the U.S.
1 Their sample contains data from the UK from both before and after the independence of the Bank of England. They …nd that far forward rates from preindependence UK behave more like those from the U.S., but far forward rates from postindependence UK behave more like Sweden. Gürkaynak et al. (2007) This paper will make use of survey data of one-year-ahead in ‡ation expectations from Consensus Economics. 2 The bene…t of this dataset it that it allows us to directly measure the adoption of in ‡ation targeting on the anchoring of in ‡ation expectations using evidence from 36 countries. This paper will consider monthly data from 1990 to 2011. Around the mid-point of this time period, 13 countries in the sample adopted in ‡ation targeting, while 23
did not. With a structural VAR analysis, we compare the behavior of in ‡ation expectations in the …rst and second halves of the sample period in both the group of 13 countries that adopted in ‡ation targeting around the year 2000 and the control group of 23 countries that did not. The results from impulse responses and variance decompositions show that there was a signi…cant decline in both the volatility and persistence of in ‡ation expectations, as well as a signi…cant reduction in the response of in ‡ation expectations to a shock to either observed in ‡ation or the price of oil between the early and late subperiods for the group of countries that adopted in ‡ation targeting around the year 2000, but there was no di¤erence between the early and late subperiods for the control group of 23 countries that did not.
Thus the adoption of in ‡ation targeting had a signi…cant e¤ect on the anchoring of in ‡ation expectations in these 13 countries.
By incorporating direct measures of in ‡ation expectations into a structural VAR, this paper can be seen as the international extension of Leduc et al. (2007) , who incorporate oneyear-ahead in ‡ation expectations from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia's Livingston survey into a structural VAR and show that there was a di¤erence in the behavior of in ‡ation expectations in the United States between the pre-and post-1979 periods. They conclude that the change in U.S. monetary regime in 1979 with the Fed Chairmanship of Paul Volcker served to anchor U.S. in ‡ation expectations. 3 In extending this analysis to 36 countries this paper reaches a similar conclusion; the adoption of in ‡ation targeting by many countries around the mid-point of our sample period was a similar monetary regime change that served to anchor in ‡ation expectations between the …rst and the second halves of our sample period.
This paper will proceed as follows. Section 2 presents the structural VAR model used in this paper and discusses the variables and sources of data. The results of this structural VAR analysis are presented in section 3. First with impulse response diagrams and then with the results from variance decompositions, this paper will show that there was a major change in the behavior of in ‡ation expectations between the …rst and second halves of the sample period for the 13 countries that adopted in ‡ation targeting around the year 2000, but there was no change in the behavior of in ‡ation expectations in the control group of 23 countries that did not. Section 4 discusses the robustness of these results to alternative identi…cation schemes in the structural VAR, and to the exclusion of certain countries from the control group. Finally section 5 concludes with some directions for further research.
Data and Econometric Model
The benchmark model is a structural VAR of one-year-ahead expected in ‡ation (EPi), observed in ‡ation (Pi), the output gap (OG), the change in the nominal price of oil (PO), and the nominal interest rate (R):
where Y t is a 5 1 vector. Impulse responses and variance decompositions are generated with a recursive identi…cation scheme with the ordering [EPi,Pi,OG,PO,R] . Expected in ‡a-tion is ordered …rst since, as will be discussed later in this section, it is pre-determined by construction. In a later section we will test the robustness of the main results to alternative ordering schemes.
This VAR model is estimated to produce impulse responses for each country in the study in both the pre-2000 and post-2000 periods. The optimal lag length is chosen for each separate estimation based on SIC tests.
Data
The countries in the analysis are separated into four groups. Developed countries that (like Canada, 1991 or Chile, 1990 and other countries that never adopted in ‡ation targeting. What distinguishes the countries in groups 3 and 4 and what sets them apart as a control group is simply the fact that they did not adopt in ‡ation targeting around the mid-point of time period studied in this paper.
We will consider monthly data from 1990 to 2011. The …rst variable in the benchmark ordering is the expected in ‡ation rate, EPi. This data is taken from the professional forecasting …rm, Consensus Economics. The Consensus survey data is collected around the middle of the month. So for instance, the observation of EPi for a given country in July of a given year is collected around July 15th. Information about the observed in ‡ation rate over the month (Pi), and the output gap (OG) wouldn't be known until the data for July is released sometime in August. Likewise, the change in the price of oil (PO) and the average interest rate over the month (R) aren't known until the end of July. Thus the observation for expected in ‡ation (EPi) is recorded long before the values of any contemporaneous variables are observed.
4
The Consensus survey asks survey respondents for their forecast of observed in ‡ation during this calendar year and the next calendar year. Thus the one-year-ahead expected in ‡ation rate is not recorded. We use a simple weighted extrapolation to combine the in ‡ation expectations over two calendar years into one measure of one-year-ahead in ‡ation expectations, where the weight placed on the response for expected in ‡ation in this calendar year is simply the number of months that are left in the year. So for instance, the oneyear-ahead expected in ‡ation rate in March is a weighted average of the forecasts for this year and next year, where the weight on the forecast for this calendar year is 9/12. The weight on the forecast for this calendar year for the one-year-ahead expected in ‡ation rate in September is 4/12.
4 More information about this data from Consensus Economics Inc. can be found at www.consensuseconomics.com/what_are_consensus_forecasts.htm.
The other variables in the VAR are standard. The observed in ‡ation rate is simply the year-over-year change in the headline consumer price index. The output gap is simply the percent deviation of industrial production from its HP …ltered trend. The change in the nominal price of oil is simply the month-over-month change in the price of oil converted into local currency terms at the spot exchange rate. The interest rate is simply the rate on 3-month government bills.
The time series of one-year-ahead in ‡ation expectations and observed in ‡ation are presented in …gures 1 and 2. Figure 1 plots the GDP weighted average of in ‡ation expectations and observed in ‡ation for the countries that adopted in ‡ation targeting around the year 2000 (groups 1 and 2) and those that did not (groups 3 and 4). The data for most countries begins in 1990, but the data for some countries in the study do not begin until the mid-1990s.
The …gure shows that both in ‡ation expectations and observed in ‡ation were relatively steady across this entire time period for counties in the control group. There is no noticeable di¤erence in either the level or the dynamics of in ‡ation expectations or observed in ‡ation between the pre-and post-2000 periods in the solid blue line. This is in contrast to the countries that adopted in ‡ation targeting around the mid-point of this sample, where in ‡a-tion expectations and observed in ‡ation were high and volatile in the …rst half of the sample period, but were steady and are similar to those in the control group during the second half of the sample period. 
Results
To show how the adoption of in ‡ation targeting has anchored in ‡ation expectations and changed the behavior of both in ‡ation expectations and observed in ‡ation, we will present the results in two parts. In the …rst we will examine the responses of observed in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations to a shock to either in ‡ation expectations, observed in ‡ation, or the price of oil. These impulse responses will be computed separately for both the pre 
Impulse responses
Impulse responses are calculated in both the pre-and post-2000 subperiods in each of the 36 countries in this study. As discussed earlier, in the benchmark speci…cation, shocks are identi…ed with a recursive identi…cation scheme with the ordering: expected in ‡ation, observed in ‡ation, the output gap, the change in the price of oil, and the short-term interest rate. In the next section we will instead consider the speci…cation where expected in ‡ation is ordered third, after observed in ‡ation and the output gap.
Impulse responses are calculated for each of the 36 countries. However, to save space, this paper will only present the GDP weighted average of these responses across the di¤erent country groupings listed in table 1. In addition, this paper will only report the responses of in ‡ation expectations and observed in ‡ation to either a shock to in ‡ation expectations, a shock to observed in ‡ation, or a shock to the price of oil. 
Variance decompositions
To identify which shocks are responsible for the ‡uctuations in both expected in ‡ation and observed in ‡ation, variance decompositions are calculated in both the pre-and post-2000 subperiods in each of the 36 countries in this study. In the benchmark speci…cation, shocks are identi…ed with a recursive identi…cation scheme with the ordering expected in ‡ation, observed in ‡ation, the output gap, the change in the price of oil, and the short-term interest rate. In the next section we will instead consider the speci…cation where expected in ‡ation is ordered third, after observed in ‡ation and the output gap. These variance decompositions are calculated for each of the 36 countries. However, to save space, this paper will only present the GDP weighted average of these variance decompositions across the di¤erent country groupings listed in table 1. The third column in the table reports the share of the forecast error variance that is due to shock to observed in ‡ation. This describes the anchoring of in ‡ation expectations. If a large part of the forecast error variance of expected in ‡ation is attributable to shocks to observed in ‡ation then in ‡ation expectations are not well anchored. If this share falls between the early and the late subperiods, then in ‡ation expectations are becoming better anchored. 7 The results for any individual country are available from the author on request.
The table shows that in the post-2000 subperiod, shocks to observed in ‡ation explain about 11% of the variance of expected in ‡ation in both groups of countries. However, in the pre-2000 subperiod, shocks to observed in ‡ation explain about 18% of the variance of expected in ‡ation in the control group of countries, but they explain as much as 26% of the variance in expected in ‡ation in the group of countries that did adopt in ‡ation targeting around 2000. Thus the share of ‡uctuations in in ‡ation expectations that are explained by shocks to observed in ‡ation has fallen between the early and late subperiods for both groups of countries, but this share has fallen more in the group of countries that adopted in ‡ation targeting around the year 2000. The anchoring of in ‡ation expectations has improved in both groups of countries, but it has improved by more in the group of countries that adopted in ‡ation targeting between the two subperiods.
These results continue to hold when we consider developed countries separately from emerging market countries. Table 3 There was almost no change, indeed a slight increase in the forecast error variance of expected infaltion between the early and late subperiods in the control group of developed countries.
Similarly, in the developed countries that adopted infaltion targeting around the year 2000, nearly 36% of the variance of expected in ‡ation at a 12 month horizon was explained by shocks to observed in ‡ation in the pre-targeting period, but only 13% or the variance of expected in ‡ation is explained by the same shock in the post-targeting period. For the control group of developed countries, the fall in this share was only from 18% to 11%. Thus within the subset of developed countries, there is strong evidence that the adoption of in ‡ation targeting had a large e¤ect on the anchoring of in ‡ation expectations and signi…cantly reduced the share of ‡uctuations in expected in ‡ation that are explained by shocks in observed in ‡ation.
The results for the subset of emerging market counties are also presented in table 3. Again we see a signi…cant fall in the forecast error variance of expected infaltion between the early and late subperiods for the set of emerging market countries that adopted in ‡ation targeting around the year 2000, from 5% to around 1%, but there was no change in the forecast error variance of expected in ‡ation in the control group of emerging market countries.
Sensitivity Analysis
To investigate the robustness of these results, we will …rst test the sensitivity of these results to an alternative recursive identi…cation scheme where expected in ‡ation in ordered after both observed in ‡ation and the output gap. Then we will test the sensitivity of these results to di¤erent country groupings, namely if the results are robust to the exclusion of the Euro Area countries (which also saw a major monetary regime change around the year 2000).
Re-ordering expected in ‡ation
In the previous section, shocks used to calculate impulse responses or variance decompositions are identi…ed with a recursive identi…cation scheme with the ordering: expected in ‡ation, observed in ‡ation, the output gap, the change in the price of oil, and the short-term interest rate. By construction, since the Consensus survey responses are collected before the data used to calculate the other variables in the model are known, expected in ‡ation should not respond to contemporaneous shock to the other variables in the model. However, since observed in ‡ation is calculated as year-over-year and the output gap is very persistent, one could argue that forecasters have a reasonable approximation for contemporaneous observed in ‡ation and the output gap when completing the survey. In this case, a recursive identi…-cation scheme with the ordering: observed in ‡ation, the output gap, expected in ‡ation, the change in the price of oil, and the short-term interest rate might be more appropriate. The responses of expected in ‡ation and observed in ‡ation to a shock to either expected in ‡ation, 
Exclusion of the Euro Area countries
The analysis so far has considered two groups of countries, those that adopted in ‡ation targeting around the year 2000 and those that did not. The Euro Area countries in the sample: France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Finland, and Slovenia, which are all included in the group of countries that did not adopt in ‡ation targeting, also experienced a major monetary regime change around this time. Therefore to ensure that the adoption of the euro by so many countries in the control group is not clouding the results, we will reaggregate the impulse responses and variance decompositions and remove these seven euro area countries from the control group of countries that did not adopt in ‡ation targeting.
The impulse responses for this new, ex-euro, control group are presented in …gure 11.
These impulse responses for the control group should be compared to those in …gure 4. The impulse responses in the two …gures are nearly identical, and thus the inclusion or exclusion of the euro area countries in the control group does not a¤ect the results. The same holds true for the variance decomposition in table 5. The the decomposition of the variance of expected in ‡ation in the ex-euro control group should be compared to the variance decomposition for the entire control group in table 2. Again, there is hardly any di¤erence in the results, and thus the inclusion or the exclusion of the euro area countries in the control group doesn't a¤ect the results. 
Summary and Conclusion

